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Abstract—In the last years there has been a significant increase
in the number of attacks to the security of cyber-physical systems
such as SCADA systems and PLC’s. We investigate security issues
in bilateral teleoperation systems i.e., systems in which the tele-
operated robots reflect back to the operator reaction forces from
the task being performed. We classify the cyber-physical attacks
in terms of target component, knowledge of the system, and goal.
We then implement our attacks on a a single-input single-output
bilateral teleoperation system equipped with a two-layer control
architecture for force feedback. This setup allows us to study
the impact of our attacks, and represents a first step towards a
complete threat model with corresponding counter-measures in
more complex bilateral teleoperation systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robotic technologies supported by the Internet of Things
paradigm are making their way into consumer and professional
products, thus raising concerns about the impact of malicious
activities targeting their physical and logical devices.
In the service robotics field, some of these devices are re-
motely controlled, i.e., tele-operated by a remote operator who
commands the robot motion through either dedicated networks
or the Internet. Typical applications are deep sea exploration,
emergency response, drone control and robotic surgery.
In the last years, several attacks have targeted cyber-physical
systems (CPSs) and industrial critical systems (ICSs), e.g.,
manipulating sensor readings and, in general, influencing
physical processes to bring the system into a state desired
by the attacker. A few attacks have been so effective that they
made the international news: the Stuxnet worm, which repro-
grammed PLCs of nuclear centrifuges in Iran [1]; the attack
on a sewage treatment facility in Queensland, Australia, which
manipulated the SCADA system to release raw sewage into
local rivers and parks [2]; the attack on a German steel mill
that prevented to shut down a blast furnace in 2014. Actually,
22 out 295 “security incidents” reported in the US ICS CERT
2015 [3] reached the core of critical control systems.
The primary approach followed by academia and industry
to face cyber-physical attacks has been to secure the com-
munication infrastructure and hardening of control systems.
There is a large body of literature on how to adapt existing IT
security methods to the characteristic features of the control
domain [4]. However, as pointed out by Gollmann et al. [5],
the concern for consequences at the physical level puts CPS
security apart from standard IT security, and demands for ad
hoc solutions to properly address a new kind of attacks: cyber-
physical attacks.
Gollmann et al. [5] provide a clear picture of the possible
goals of a cyber-physical attacker: (i) equipment damage,
i.e., attacks aiming for physical damage of equipment or
infrastructure (e.g., pipes, valves, etc.); (ii) production damage,
when the attacker goes after the production process to spoil the
product or make production more expensive; (iii) compliance
violation, when the attacker tries to damage the safety and
the environment impact of the industrial plant. Furthermore,
they fix the stages that a cyber-physical attacker should go
through before achieving her goals: access, discovery, control,
damage, and cleanup. In the current paper, we focus on the
fourth stage, damage, where the attacker may have a rough
idea of the control plan of the target system. The systematic
preparatory analysis to acquire knowledge about the system
under attack is beyond the scope of our work.
In this paper, we investigate security issues in bilateral
teleoperation systems i.e., systems in which the tele-operated
robots reflect back to the operator reaction forces from the
task being performed. The security of teleoperation systems
has been addressed in [6], [7], [8], [9] with a focus on robotic
surgery, a safety critical application. The target system of these
experiments is the Raven II laboratory surgical robot [10].
However, the aforementioned works analyze only unilateral
teleoperation systems, i.e., systems in which the remote robots
do not reflect back to the operator forces and/or positions.
Whereas in a bilateral contexts both master and slave provide
sensing and actuating capabilities to leverage a perception to
the operator as if she was in the remote environment. As a
consequence, in bilateral systems both sensors and actuators on
the master side provide an additional attack vector. Although
bilateral teleoperation systems are used in specific applica-
tions, an exhaustive analysis of their security properties allows
us to identify weaknesses occurring in unilateral systems as
well. This is because bilateral systems are more sensitive to
stability degradation and to the response capabilities of the
human operator.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has studied
cyber-physical attacks in bilateral teleoperation systems.
Contributions: We implement a number of different
attacks on a simple bilateral teleoperation system consisting of
two haptic paddles [11] equipped with the two-layer control
architecture [12]. This setup avoids the complication of multi-
input multi-output systems, such as real robots, allowing us to
focus on the effects of the attacks. The proposed attacks tamper
with both the computer network traffic and the mechatronics
of the system, i.e., sensors and actuators.
Require: xi(k), vi(k), τi(k), H+(k), where i ∈ {s,m}
Ensure: , τ i(k), H−(k)
Update Tank energy value:
1: H(k) = H(k − 1) +H+(k)−∆HI(k)−H−(k)
where,
• H+(k) received energy from the other side
• ∆HI(k) = τi(k − 1)∆x(k) energy needed by the robot
• H−(k) = β(H(k − 1) +H+(k)−∆HI(k)), β ∈ {0, 1} sent energy
to the other side
Compute torque:




0, H(k) ≤ 0
τi(k), otherwise
• τmax2 = H(k)/(v#T )
3: if isMaster then
4: τm(k) = τPLm (k) + τTLC(k)
where,
• τTLC = −d(k)vm(k)
• d(k) =
{
α(Hd −H(k)), if H(k) < Hd, α ∈ R+
0
5: else
6: τs(k) = τPLs (k)
7: end if
Algorithm 1: Passivity layer
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
• We classify attacks in terms of targeted components,
system knowledge, and goals, in the context of bilateral
teleoperation systems.
• We replicate known attacks on unilateral systems in
our bilateral setting to analyze how the force feedback,
transmitted to the master device from the slave, is affected
during the attacks.
• We propose an attack that can only affect a bilateral
architecture as it compromises the controller that pro-
vides stability to the system. This attack tampers with
the network packets sent to the slave and degrades the
performances of the system.
• Finally, we exhibit an attack that tampers the controller
to damage the robot motors which does not show any
immediate effects on neither the cyber component nor
the physical one. This attack targets the slave’s actuator
to damage it in the long run and requires the knowledge
of the mechatronical parts of the robot.
Outline: The paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we briefly summarize the two-layer control architecture. In
Section III we provide a taxonomy of cyber-physical attacks
on bilateral teleoperation systems. Experimental results are
discussed in Section IV. Finally, in Section V we draw
conclusions and discuss related and future work.
II. TWO-LAYER TELEOPERATION ARCHITECTURE
Our analysis focuses on bilateral teleoperation systems.
These system may get unstable because of different combina-
tions of the following aspects: communication delays, contact
with the remote environment, relaxed grasp of the master
device and force control settings of the slave manipulator. The
passivity theory [13] has provided a solution for the stability
of bilateral teleoperation systems through several implemen-
tations that can be found in the literature (see, for instance,
[14], [15] and [12]). Our experimental setup implements the
two-layer approach proposed in [12] to guarantee the stability
in the presence of time-varying communication delay. In this
approach, the control architecture has a transparency layer,
where the commands for the master and the slave robots are
computed according to the chosen architecture (e.g., position-
force as in [12], or position-position [16] as in the present
setup), and a passivity layer that guarantees the passivity of
the system by monitoring two energy tanks Hm and Hs at the
master and slave side, respectively, (see Figure 1).
In our position-position architecture, the command torques
are computed as follows:
τs(k) = kP (xsd(k)− xs(k)) + kD(vsd(k)− vs(k))
τm(k) = kP (xmd(k)− xm(k)) + kD(vmd(k)− vm(k))
where t = kTs is the time, k ∈ Z, Ts is the sample time of
the discrete-time controllers, and the reference positions are
xsd(k) = xm(k − dm2s(k))
xmd(k) = xs(k − ds2m(k))
with dm2s and ds2m are the master-to-robot and robot-to-
master time-varying delays, respectively. The force τm allows
the operator to perceive a force feedback of the interaction of
the tele-operated robot with the remote environment.
The passivity layer of [12] implements the Algorithm 1
reported above for reader’s convenience. Please, note that if
the energies Hm and Hs are positive in both master and robot
tanks, then the system is passive and can be safely connected
to passive (but unknown) operator and environment.
III. A TAXONOMY OF CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON
TELEOPERATION SYSTEMS
In this section, we provide a taxonomy of cyber-physical
attacks in teleoperation systems according to: (i) the target
of the attack, (ii) the attacker’s knowledge of the system, and
(iii) the goal of the attack. In the following we will refer to
the letters A1, . . . , A6 to address specific attacks that target
different subcomponents of the system represented in Figure 1.
A. Targets of the attack
Most of the cyber-physical attacks target the communication
network. A man in the middle attack (see A1 in Figure 1)
can alter the content of packets traveling from master to
the robot manipulator and vice versa, if no cryptography
is implemented. In particular, the attacker may change the
command or the measurement values. If the packets were
encrypted then the attacker may still: (i) drop the packets; (ii)
resend old packets (replay attack); (iii) delay the packets. The
last attack is rather severe in a teleoperation system because
delays affect not only system performance and operability, but
also the bilateral stability. Moreover, it is very difficult for the
user to understand if this performance degradation is due to a
delay attack or to a network congestion.
Another target for a cyber-physical attack is the mecha-
tronics system, i.e., those sensors and actuators that compose
Fig. 1. Two-layers bilateral teleoperation system with potential vulnerabilities.
the teleoperation system. This type of attack is labeled in
Figure 1 as A2, A5 if the target is an actuator and A3, A4
if the target is a sensor. Therefore, in a bilateral setting the
attacker may target both the master and the slave, whereas
in unilateral systems the adversary may only target actuators
and sensors in the slave A2, A3. Through the actuation of the
master, a bilateral architecture leverages an additional attack
vector. Malicious activities targeting the master could alter the
feedback reflected to the operator. In fact the haptic devices
handled by the operator could have very powerful motors, and
an attacker could induce sudden and abrupt movements that
might harm the operator. To alter the data before they are sent
to the network (measurements xm and xs) or after they are
received (reference signals xmd and xsd) the attacker must
have a direct access to the system. This could be gained after
a preparation phase during which the data flow to and from
the system is analyzed via a proper malware [17].
Similar targets have been identified in papers [17], [6].
B. Attacker’s knowledge
Another criterion to classify cyber-physical attacks is the
attacker’s knowledge of the system [5]. We consider two
different scenarios: blind attacks and model-aware attacks.
In the blind attack scenario, the attacker has no insight about
the system configuration and its control architecture. However,
general informations on bilateral system may be enough to
alter their functioning. For instance, Denial of service (DoS)
attacks (see A1 in Figure 1) can be achieved by exhausting
the bandwidth capacity of the communication network, as in
[6]. In this case, the identification of the packets belonging to
the system under attack is the only requirement.
In the model-aware attack scenario, the attacker has some
knowledge of the system (plant and/or controller) and intends
to exploit it for a malicious purpose. For example, knowing
the actual position of the arms of the robot manipulator, the
attacker could overwrite the actuator commands to damage the
arms by inducing a collision. Moreover an accurate knowledge
of the system may allow the attacker to operate in stealthy
manner, i.e., perpetrating the malicious actions without being
detected. In the context of bilateral systems, the adversary
might disable in a stealthy manner the controls that provide
stability to the system which will make the system unstable
when time-varying delays will occur.
C. Attacker’s goal
Another way to classify the attacks is by considering the
goal of the attacker:
1) damage the robot: the attacker may target sensors or
actuators of the teleoperation system at the master or
at the slave sides. By tampering with the content of
the packets it is possible to induce the robot make
unexpected movements and, if there is a communication
delay, the operator has no time to send an alert and
stop the system. The attacker can also adopt a stealthy
approach to damage an electromechanical device. If a
damaging signal is sent for a long period, superimposed
to the correct commands, the system will apparently
behave as usual but additional wearing effects will pass
unnoticed. An example of this attack will be shown in
the Experimental Section IV by adding a high frequency
sinusoidal component to the actuator commands.
2) performance degradation: in this case the goal is to
reduce the performance in terms of usability of the
teleoperated system. The attack may be blind as it
requires only the identification of the packets belonging
traveling on the communication channel. Delays and
packet dropouts are easy ways to reach the goal.
Alternatively the attacker may affect the system in such a
way that the robots will move in an unsteady way instead
of smoothly as expected by the operator. This will
reduce the usability of the teleoperated system. For this
purpose, the attacker should alter the commands that the
actuator receives (attack A2 in Figure 1). Alternatively,
the adversary could target the actuators of the master
robot (attack A4). For instance, she could increase the
stiffness of the haptic device controlled by the operator.
The same goal may be achieved by attacking the video
streaming (attack A6). If the attacker can delay the video
stream by adding an offset, the operator will experience
a disturbing time misalignment between the perceived
force feedback and the video information.
3) damage the environment: in the context of industrial
robots, the attacker might damage the system or cause
injuries to operators, by changing the precision of the
robot movements or by substantial alterations of safety
devices. This is becoming a realistic scenario as vendors
are introducing several models of collaborative robots
(or cobots), able to work nearby humans (e.g., ABBs
YuMi, FANUCs CR-35iA) [18]. In the case of a tele-
operated surgical robot even small uncontrollable or
random motions of the robotic arms holding the surgical
Fig. 2. Haptic Paddles at the master and robot side.
tools (e.g., a scalpel) may cause damage to the internal
organs of the patient.
In the context of industrial robots, production outcome alter-
ing, physical damage, production/plant halting and unautho-
rized accesses have been studied in [17].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experimental setup is composed of two haptic paddles
(see Figure 2) controlled by an Arduino Uno rev3 board,
[19], and connected in a bilateral teleoperation fashion by
ROS [20]. The haptic paddle is a partially revised version
of the one developed at ETH Zürich and is described in
details in [11]. It is worth recalling here that the sampling
frequency is set to 100Hz and that the network is emulated
by a ROS node running on a Ubuntu 14.04 Linux machine
with low-latency kernel installed to guarantee a soft real-time
architecture. The communication delays dm2s and ds2m can be
constant or random (e.g., Gaussian, uniform) and also packet
loss can be simulated. The two-layer algorithm is implemented
in two ROS nodes as well: one for the master side and one for
the slave side, as they exchange data according to the block
diagram in Figure 1.
In the following subsections we describe the implementation
of some of the attacks described in Section III and their
impacts on the bilateral teleoperation system. We also examine
the consequences of some attacks that have been proposed
in previous works on unilateral systems. In addition, we
explore the effects on the operator at the master side when
the slave robot is attacked. This is possible because our
teleoperation system provides sensory perceptions from the
remote environment to the operator via the haptic paddle.
For the sake of clarity, we divide our attacks in blind and
model-aware attacks.
A. Blind Attacks
In this section, we provide a number of attacks that do not
have any knowledge about the system under attack.
1) Denial of Service: The attacker needs to identify the
packets of the teleoperation system and then send a large
amount of packets to congest the channel. This kind of attack
has been also discussed in [6] because no knowledge about
the system is required to carry out the attack, and the effects
on system usability can be dramatic.
Our attacker generates a time-varying delay according to:
dAi (k) = d
A
i (k − 1) + ri(k)± ai, i = m2s, s2m (1)
where ri(k) is a uniform random variable U(rmin, rmax) and
a ∈ R+. If dAi (k) > Nd then the packet gets lost by buffer
overflow in the router.



























Fig. 3. DoS at the slave robot side. Legend: blue dotted line: position
of the master xm(k), red dashed line: robot reference position xsd(k) =
xm(k − dm2s(k)), black solid line: robot position xs(k). Parameters:
Nd = dTd/Tse, Td = 1.7s, rmin = 0.1s, rmax = 0.3s, a = 0.007s.
Figure 3 shows an example of the impact of the DoS attack
on the position error. During the DoS (gray region) packets get
lost. This implies that the reference position xsd is frozen to
the last received value and the actual position xs of the robot
does not change. When the DoS is over, the new reference
position xsd is received: the tracking error xsd − xs is large
and therefore the motor torque τs is also large. This generates
the oscillations that appear in the time series of xs.
Due to the bilateral connection of master and slave, the
attack at the slave side will occur at the master side as well.
In addition, if the delay is not properly managed by the control
architecture then unstable oscillations may occur.
2) Packet drop: Having access to the communication net-
work, the attacker can drop packets traveling from the master
to the slave robots to make the robots moving irregularly.
Figure 4 shows the displacement between the master position
and the robot position for two packet drop rates: the higher is
the drop rate the closer is the position xs to a step-wise signal.
Due to the derivative terms within the controllers, the
packet drop can also affect the control theoretical stability of
the system and force the passivity layer to intervene with a
consequent change in the system behavior.
3) Delay of packets: This attack imposes an additional
communication delay (D sample times) to the packets from the
master to the slave robots over certain periods. The value of D
can be selected according to a uniform or Gaussian distribution
to mask the attack as a ‘normal’ congestion of the network.
Figure 5 show two examples of this kind of attack for different
Gaussian statistics D ∼ G(µ, σ2).











































Fig. 4. Packet drop at the robotic side. Top: packet drop rate equal to 90%
(1 out of 10 packets is received by the robot controller). Bottom: packet drop
rate equal to 90% (1 out of 15 packets is received by the robot controller).
The attack works as follows:
• Gray regions: the attacker delays the packets by D sample
times, i.e., for DTs seconds the slave robot does not
receive any new packet from the master.
• Yellow regions: After DTs seconds the robot receives the
old packets for DTs seconds whereas the proper packets
are discharged.
• White regions: The correct packets are received by the
robot. The discontinuity produces oscillations as can be
seen in the time series of xs in Figure 5.





























Fig. 5. Delay of packets. Legend: blue dotted line: position of the master
xm(k), red dashed line: robot reference position xsd(k) = xm(k −
dm2s(k) − D(k)), black solid line: robot position xs(k). Top: µ = 0.3s,
σ = 0.1s; Bottom: µ = 0.6s, σ = 0.4s
4) Force feedback analysis: All previous attacks affect the
slave robot in a similar manner by inducing an oscillation in
the robot. Moreover, if the robotic devices are connected on a
shared network then the distinction between attacker’s effects
and normal congestions might become difficult.
Figure 6 shows the force feedback provided to the operator
over the three attacks. Each attack induces sudden and abrupt
movements on the slave robot. As we are dealing with a
bilateral architecture and the attacks cause a misalignment
between the position of the master and the slave, the tracking



















Drop, DoS & Delay







































Fig. 6. Master feedback. Legend: blue line: master feedback. First plot: Drop
attack (93 %). Second: DoS attack. Third: Delay attack (µ = 0.6s, σ = 0.4).
error of the master controller will be affected as well. As a
consequence, the operator will perceive sudden and abrupt
feedbacks from the master robot that may not occur in
unilateral teleoperation systems. In particular, on each time
series of the force feedback, a large and abrupt peak indicates
the occurrence of an attack. The higher is the peak the stronger
is the impact of the attack; thus DoS and Delay attacks have a
more severe impact than the drop attack. Note that the colored
regions (gray and yellow) match the regions of the attacks
given in the previous section.
Note that a bilateral architecture aims to leverage a percep-
tion to the operator as if it was in the remote environment.
Hence, tampering with the force feedback might impede the
operator to perform its task correctly. This is particularly
relevant when the remote robot is interacting with a unknown
remote environment. For instance, in a robot-surgical context
the system might provide false tactile sensations to the sur-
geon, with obvious consequences.
B. Model-aware attacks
In this section, we assume that the attacker has some
knowledge about the plant and its control architecture.
1) Tampering energy values for instability: Here, we pro-
vide a specific attack for bilateral teleoperation systems where
the adversary compromises the correct functioning of the two-
layer algorithm. We assume that the attacker has access to:
(i) the position and reference data that both master and robot
send through the network, and (ii) the energy quanta H+ ex-
changed between master and robot tanks. Other teleoperation
algorithms (e.g., [16]) would require different knowledge.
We recall that the passivity layer detects and prevents unsta-
ble behavior of the master and the slave robots by comparing
the available energy within the tanks, and the amount of energy
needed to perform the actual actions. If the attacker would be
able to modify the amount of energy that arrives from the
master then the slave robot can be induced to believe that
there is plenty of energy available. As a consequence, the slave
robot might move in an unstable way without the protection
of the passivity layer. If the communication delay is large, the
operator will see the wrong motion on the video streaming
when is too late to react.
Figure 7(a) shows the normal working condition of the two-
layer algorithm when the energy at the robot side is below
a threshold (parameter selected by the designer according to
the particular application); the passivity layer modulates the
commands and asks for energy at the master side.
When the system is under attack (gray region), fake energy
quanta H+ are sent to the robot tank as shown in Figure 7(b).
The level of the energy is always at the maximum (0.1J in this
case). The position xs exhibits some oscillatory behavior that
the passivity layer does not counter-act because the checks
on τmax1 and τmax2 are always satisfied (line 2 in Algorithm
1). This attack could be implemented at different points: (i)
on the master controller which could send more energy than
requested; (ii) on the communication channel, as the attacker
could tamper with the packets and alter the energy quanta sent
to the slave; (iii) on the slave controller.
Another possibility is to increase the amount of energy
required by the slave robot. In order to extract energy from the
operator, the master controller activates a software damper. In
this case the operator is feeling a damping effect that is not
real and that could affect its interpretation of the interaction
of the slave robot with the environment.
2) Small vibration on the command: This attack superim-
poses a high-frequency sinusoidal term to the commands sent
to the motors of the slave robots [21]. Since the mechanical
subsystem behaves as a low pass filter, there is no observ-
able effects on the motion of the robot. Nevertheless, the
superimposition of this term will stress the electro-mechanical
subsystem that eventually will be damaged. This additive term
can be introduced directly on the command if the attacker has
access to the input of the high-voltage amplifier that powers
the motors:
τAs (k) = τs(k) +Aτ sin(2πFTsk) (2)
or by modifying the reference position accordingly:
τAs (k) = kP (x
A
sd(k)− xs(k)) + kD(vsd(k)− vs(k))
= kP (xsd(k) +Ax sin(2πFTsk)− xs(k)) +
+ kD(vsd(k)− vs(k))
= τs(k) + kPAx sin(2πFTsk)
Note that an actuated master could also be affected by this
attack. Figure 8 shows the total energy with and without the
superposition of the sinusoidal term. The heating due to the
extra energy will damage the motors in the long run.
V. CONCLUSIONS, RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have classified cyber-physical attacks in
bilateral teleoperation systems in terms of target components,










































(a) normal two-layer algorithm










































(b) attack on the energy tank at the slave robot side
Fig. 7. Tampering energy values for instability. (a)/(b) Top: dotted blue line:
xd, solid black line: xs. Middle: dotted blue line: energy level of the master
tank, solid black line: energy level of the robot tank. Bottom: dotted blue line:
command τs, solid black line: modulated command τ̄s. Gray region in (b):
attack period. Round trip time delay dm2s + ds2d ∼ G(1, 0.1).
knowledege of the system, and goals. This setup allows us
to study the impact of our attacks, and represents a first step
towards a complete threat model with corresponding counter-
measures in more complex bilateral teleoperation systems. We
have analyzed the impact of different kinds of cyber-physical
attacks carried out on a experimental setup of a single-input
single-output bilateral teleoperation system with a two-layer
control architecture for force feedback. Some of these attacks
have already been studied in a telesurgery setting [6] and
implemented in a unilateral teleoperation system. We have
shown the effects of these malicious activities on a bilateral
teleoperation system. In particular, we have shown how the































































Fig. 8. Vibration on the robot commands. First plot: dotted blue line: xd,
solid black line: xs. Second: command computed by the transparency layer
τs. Third: Command modified by the attacker τAs (Aτ = 0.12V). Fourth:
Dissipated energy on the robot motor: Dashed blue line: without attack, Solid
red line: with attack. Round trip time delay dm2s + ds2d ∼ G(0.05, 0.01).
force feedback transmitted to the master haptic device from the
slave, is affected during the attacks. Then, we have provided a
model-aware attack that may affect only bilateral architectures
by compromising the controller that provides stability to the
systems. Furthermore, we have shown a malicious tampering
of the controller that does not trigger any immediate effect on
neither the cyber nor the physical part.
Related work: A number of security issues of industrial
robot controllers have been addressed in [17]. The authors have
analyzed both system-specific attacks and the minimal set of
security requirements that industrial robots should guarantee.
Furthermore, they have proposed a domain-specific attacker
model and conducted an experimental security assessment on
a de facto-standard robot. Exploitation of software vulnera-
bilities are presented which can compromise completely and
remotely the robot-controlling computers. Although this work
does not address directly the security issues of teleoperation
systems, it analyzes attacks on a complete and realistic deploy-
ment. Thus, the same security flaws might affect the controlled
robot of a teleoperation system.
As said in the Introduction, the security of teleoperation
systems has been addressed in papers [6], [7], [8], [9] in
the context of the Raven II laboratory surgical robot [10].
In [6] the authors analyze Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks,
define performance metrics to evaluate the attack impact
and also propose defensive strategies to mitigate the attack
effects. In [7] the authors approach the attacks from a different
perspective: they assume the attacker has some knowledge of
robot inner workings, and is able to exploit this knowledge
by injecting faults at the worst possible moments, either for
the robots or the surgery as such. The attack is carried out
by changing one valid control command to another valid
(malicious) command, without violating any protocol syntax.
The same authors have proposed [8] a general principle for
detecting cyber-physical attacks that combines the knowledge
of simulations from both cyber and physical domain process
to estimate the adverse consequences of malicious activities in
a timely manner. The attacks alter valid commands to impact
the physical processes without affecting the cyber domain. In
[9], the proposed attacks exploit the communication between
the master and the surgical robot based on a network hub and
the Interoperable Teleoperation Protocol (ITP).
Another important aspect of the security of cyber-physical
systems regards their verification and validation using formal
methodologies rather than simulation-test systems [22]. In this
respect, we recently proposed formal languages to express and
reason on CPSs and cyber-physical attacks [23]. The goal of
that paper is to lay and streamline theoretical foundations
to reason about, and statically detect, attacks to physical
devices. In fact, the complexity of CPSs call for (semi-)formal
verification tools to provide both an exhaustive search of
all possibles behaviours of systems under attacks, and exact,
rather than approximate, quantitative results. A rare example
of formal security analysis of CPSs can ben found in [24].
Future work: Although ours and the aforementioned
works have focused on experimental setups, we have learned
from [17] that a robotic controller of a de-facto standard
robot in a industrial context can be completely and remotely
compromised. The final goal of our on going efforts is the
development of countermeasures along the lines of [25], [26],
[27]. For instance, Cómbita et al. [25] and Zhu and Basar [26]
applied game theory to capture the conflict of goals between
an attacker trying to maximize the damage inflicted to a CPS
and a defender which aims to minimize it [27]. In the context
of teleoperation, some preliminary results can be found in [28].
We aim to extend these results in the context of bilateral
teleoperation systems.
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